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The perspective of an operator not an academic 
 
Focus on “Practical Application” 
 
Bridge between two worlds… 
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Healthcare and Public Health 
Sector Vision Statement  
l  The Sector’s CI/KR Vision : 
 
–  Achieve sector resiliency against all threats ― natural and manmade 
 
–  Prevent or minimize damage to, or destruction of, the nation’s 
healthcare and public health infrastructure 
 
–  Preserve the ability to mount a timely and effective response 
–  Strive to protect the health sector’s critical workforce from harm 
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Major Challenges in Assessing the 
Healthcare and Public Health 
Sector 
l  Vastness and complexity of the sector 
l  Hierarchal nature of systems 
 
l  Jurisdictional variation 
l  No concurrence on system architecture 
l  Determining appropriate relationships to model 
l  The ever evolving Public Health and Healthcare Sector 
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Vastness and Complexity 
l  Healthcare 
–  Goal: To treat and restore the health of individuals 
–  System with clear inputs, throughputs and outputs 
–  Services are provided for by the private sector 
l  Public Health 
–  Goal: Health of populations 
–  Not a system but rather linkages of causation with intervention 
strategies 
–  Services are provided for by the public sector 
l  During a disaster conflict arises when government is forced 
to provide services that are normally provided for by the 
private sector 
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Vastness and Complexity   
l  A vast network comprised of 
–  Over 13 million--Healthcare Providers   
–  Over 6 K: Hospitals    
–  Over 700 K: Ambulatory Facilities 
–  Over 70 K:  Long Term Care Facilities 
–  Over 6.9 K:  Home Health Agencies 
–  Over 70 K:  Pharmacies-- 
–  Over 172 K: Laboratories 
–  Over 2.5 K: Pharmaceutical Manufactures 
l  Majority of sector is located in the private and not for profit hands 
 
Health Sector Specific Plan to National Infrastructure Protection Plan 




l  National Structure 
–  3,000 county and city health departments and local boards of health 
–  59 state and territorial health departments 
–  Tribal health departments 
l  Pennsylvania’s Structure 
–  Pennsylvania Department of Health 
  Links to communities through 6 Health Districts, with each District responsible for 8 to 13 
counties 
  Pennsylvania operates a network of Health Districts and 57 state health centers 
  They also provide oversight for 10 county and municipal health departments that service 40% 
of the population 
l  Southeastern Pennsylvania District (SEPA) Structure 
–  A five county district that is a mix of urban, suburban, and rural communities 
–  1 City Health Department, 3 County Health Departments (No County Health 
Departments in Philadelphia or Delaware Counties) 
Healthcare and Public Health 
Architecture 
Network Analysis – Sector Framework and Terminology 
Identify Cross-Sector and International 
Dependencies  
Determining the Correct 
Relationships to Model 
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Networks 
l  Networks are abstract maps that depict relationships 
Node Node 
Node 
Link (Shows Relationship) 
Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation Vol 1, T.G. Lewis 2003-2004, Chapters 4 & 5 
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Links and nodes can abstractly represent the relationship 
between people 
Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation Vol 1, T.G. Lewis 2003-2004, Chapters 4 & 5 
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Medical Supply Chain Network 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Pharmaceutical Distributor 
Blood Distribution Center 
Medical Equipment Manufacturer 
Hospital 
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Defining Relationships to Model 
l  Deciding the correct relationship to model presents challenges in the 
health sector because there are no sector wide common denominators 
 
l  If we choose brick and mortar facilities in the medical supply chain as 
our hubs what do we then choose as our link? 
 
–  Commodities delivered?  Are some commodities more critical than others?  
Is medical oxygen and blood on the same par as bed linen and wheel 
chairs? 
–  Are pharmaceutical manufacturers and a hospitals comparable? 
–  Can you compare a cancer center to a cardiac center to a teaching hospital? 
The Ever Evolving 
Public Health and Healthcare 
Sector 
American Healthcare Trends 
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Trends in Healthcare Continue to 
Shape the Sector 
1960-2000 
–  % of GDP spent on healthcare 5.1% to 14% ↑ 
 
1975-1995 
–  Number of acute care hospital beds declined  
 by 22% ↓ 
–  Hospital admissions decline by 5% ↓ 
–  Average length of stay per patient declines by 33% ↓ 
–  Inpatient surgical procedures declines by 27% ↓ 
 
Since 1950 
–  3 times more elderly (> 65 years old) 
–  By 2035 this will increase to approx 80 million in the United States 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no2/jarvis.htm 
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How Healthcare Delivery Trends 
Shape the Sector 
l  Number of Emergency Departments Nationwide ↓ 
 
l  Number of Acute Care Facilities Nationwide ↓ 
l  Demand for Patients Requiring Intensive Care ↑ 
 
l  Number of surgeries performed in outpatient setting ↑ 
 






How Trends are Causing the Sector to 
Emerge 
l  Fewer and smaller Hospitals with fewer emergency departments 
l  More and larger intensive care units 
l  Greater severity of illnesses in hospital patient population 
l  National nursing shortage 
l  Downsizing of hospital infectious control programs 
Delaware Valley 
Hospital Resiliency Project 
A MBRA Demonstration Project 
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Statement of the Problem 
l  At the facility level there is no widely accepted, probability based, 
risk assessment methodology to assess the impact a large scale 
disaster will have on a hospital 
 
l  Current assessment tools do not meet the NIPP’s baseline 
criteria for risk calculus  
Risk=(Consequence*Vulnerability*Threat) 
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Project Objectives and Expected 
Outcomes 
l  Goal: Improve hospital survivability and enhance health sector 
resiliency in all hazard threat environment 
l  Objective: Field Test MBRA methodology and determine its 
applicability to the healthcare sector as a means to improve hospital 
survivability and enhance the healthcare sector’s resiliency in an all 
hazard threat environment 
l  Expected Outcome #1: Determine critical distributors and suppliers 
through network analysis 
l  Expected Outcome #2: Use fault and event tree analysis to identify 
major weaknesses (vulnerabilities) of a hospital 
l  Expected Outcome #3: Identify the most significant functions 
(consequences) that are lost when dependent sectors are compromised 
l  Expected Outcome #4: Determine the most appropriate resource 
allocation strategy to mitigate risk 
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Potential Benefits 
l  Moving to a risk-based approach to building hospital resiliency 
l  Benefits Patients 
–  Evacuating patients exposes them to increased harm 
l  Benefits Hospitals 
–  Continuity of operations 
–  Continuity of billing  
l  Benefits Taxpayers 
–  Less demand for government response operations 
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Project Organization 
l  DHHS Region Three 
l  Delaware Valley Healthcare Council 
–  Fox Chase Hospital 
–  Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania 
–  Abington Memorial Hospital 
–  Lankenau Hospital 
–  McGee Rehabilitative 
–  Cooper Hospital 
l  Workgroups 
–  Supply Chain Workgroup 
–  Hospital Workgroup 
–  Finance Group 
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Delaware Valley Region 
l  Delaware Valley Region 
–  Geopolitical 
  Mix of urban, suburban and rural communities 
  Encompasses Southeastern Pennsylvania, Southern New Jersey and 
Northern Delaware  
  Encompasses two FEMA regions 
–  Delaware Valley Healthcare Sector 
  Largest concentration of tertiary (rehab) hospital beds in the nation 
  Highly competitive healthcare market 
  Largest industry in Southeastern Pennsylvania 
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Defining the Elements of Risk 
Calculus 
l  Risk = Consequences * Vulnerabilities * Threat (R=C*V*T) 
l  Consequences (C) are defined as the loss hospital functions due 
to an adverse event generated by the exploitation of a 
vulnerability.  Downstream consequences associated with a 
specific vulnerability plays a vital role in risk management 
calculations 
l  Vulnerabilities (V) are defined as weaknesses that would degrade 
hospital functions.  These vulnerabilities include key 
dependencies on: power (p); water (w); energy (e); IT/telcom (i) 
and transportation (t) 
l  Threat (T) is defined as the likelihood that any of these key 
dependencies would be interrupted. [T=p*w*e*i*t] 
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Threat Specific Modeling 
Once the network has been mapped it is possible to look at specific threats 

























































Hurricane X X X X X 
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Consequences 
l  Regardless of the threat scenario the impact on a hospital can be 
seen as two types of threats 
l  Threat of disrupted services provided by interdependent sectors 
l  Threat of patients presenting at a hospital and overwhelming staff 
(Patient Surge) 
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Loss of Power 
 
Sector Dependencies as Threats 
 Hospitals back up generators are designed for immediate life safety 
 Back up generators will not operate HVAC or elevators 
 Many hospitals have generators and switching rooms located in flood prone areas such as basements 





Tech Dependent Homecare 
Home mechanical ventilator failures and increase cardiac arrests can be expected at hospital 
Emergency Rooms.  This problem may be exacerbated by the nationwide trend to close hospital  
emergency departments. 





Tech Dependent Homecare 
Loss of power to transportation sector may have bleed over effects to medical  
supply chain distribution networks.  Possible shortages of oxygen, blood, food, and  
pharmaceuticals should be anticipated 





Tech Dependent Homecare 
Loss of electric may impact water distribution systems, sanitation 
systems and hospital infection control programs 





Tech Dependent Homecare 
Telecom and IT failure may impact a facilities ability 
to evacuate, exercise command and control, manage 
electronic medical records, hospital bed count and  
other informatics systems 
 
Loss of electrical power may result in 
degradations of the 911 System 
Sector Dependencies as Threats 
Micro Network Analysis 
 

















Modes of Healthcare Delivery  
for a Notional Geographic Area 
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Categories of Healthcare Delivery 
and Network Symbols 
Acute Care Facility (AC) 
    -Hospitals 
    -Clinics 
Long Term Care Facility (LTC) 
    -Nursing Home 
    -Group Home 
    -Assisted Living Facility 
Rehabilitative and Transitional Care (RTC) 
Group Practices (GP) 
☼ Private Practice 
The relationship to be modeled  
is common ownership 
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Acute Care Facilities 
41 
Long Term Care Facilities 
42 



































Independent nodes that are not part of an 






































































Networks BLUE and GREEN 
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BLUE vs GREEN 
(Assumptions) 
l  Blue and Green operate in the same geographic space and are 
business rivals 
l  There is no incentive for Blue and Green to cooperate 
l  Blue doesn’t want to send patients to green and vice versa 
l  Blue and Green have deep pockets and are better positioned to 
reach more patients during a disaster and provide better care 
l  Facilities that are not part of an integrated health network are the 
facilities that will be more dependent upon government resources 
during a disaster 
 
NOTE:  Katrina Integrated Delivery Networks (IDN) evacuated their 




































Designated Coordinating Hospital 












“A” Coordinates Evacuation and 
Regulates Patient Flow 
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A’s Evacuation Responsibilities 
l  Network GREEN: (1) ACF, (2) LTC, (1) RTC 
l  Network BLUE: (1) LTC and (1) RTC 
l  Non Network facilities: (2) LTC 
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“A” as a Critical Node 
l  A’s designation as a regional healthcare coordinating center forms a 
highly connected critical node 
l  Likewise, A is located within the disaster impact zone 
l  Survivability of “A’s” coordination function is  critical since evacuation 
of other facilities depends upon their ability to regulate patient flow and 
coordinate evacuation resources 
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Biological Agent Release 
























Planning and support 
State Public Health 
Department 
Epidemiologic services, 
laboratory services, advice 
















Note: Not all areas of the country 
have BioWatch sensors. 
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Biological Agent Release 
























Planning and support 
State Public Health 
Department 
Epidemiologic services, 
laboratory services, advice 
















Note: Not all areas of the country 























The BioWatch Network 
CDC 
PA BioWatch 
Monitors LRN Member 
Labs 
County 




Hubs: Labs, Hospitals, Health Departments 
Links: BioWatch Detection Information 
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The Universe of Planning 
Event Occurs 




Preparedness Planning Readiness Planning 




More grounded in economics 
Results not readily apparent and may 
need economic modeling such as  
Cost Benefit Analysis to demonstrate value 
More attractive to response community 
Results of planning effort are more tangible  
and easily seen through exercises and real 
world events 
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SEPA BioWatch Failure 
OR 
BioWatch Failure 
Workforce Capacity  





Systems and Capacity 75% 75% 75% 
98% 





























Vulnerability After Allocation Amount Allocated 
Workforce Only 5% $0 
 
Information and 





Workforce and Info 
System 
12.47% $4.8 Million 
Workforce and Org 
Capacity 
12.47% $4.8 Million 
Information System 
and Org Capacity 
12.47% $4.8 Million 
All three 
vulnerabilities 











WF I O WF+I WF+O I+O WF+I+O
Before
After
Recommend funding equal amounts to each vulnerability 
Workforce: $10 Million 
Information/Data Systems: $10 Million 
Organizational Capacity: $10 Million 
